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ABSTRACT 
 
Rising per capita income, urbanization and globalization are changing the 
consumption basket in the developing countries towards high-value commodities (like 
fruits & vegetables, milk, meat, poultry, fish, etc.). This paper explores how smallholders 
can benefit from the emerging opportunities from a silent demand-driven changes in 
high-value agriculture in India.   The study examines the institutional mechanisms 
adopted by different firms to integrate small producers of milk, broilers and vegetables in 
supply chain and their effects on producers’ transaction costs and farm profitability. The 
study finds that the innovative institutional arrangements in the form of contract farming 
have considerably reduced transaction costs and improved market efficiency to benefit 
the smallholders. The study does not find any bias against smallholders in contract 
farming.  Also, the study does not find that the relevant firms have exploited their 
monopsonistic position by paying lower prices to farmers. On the contrary, contract 
producers were found enjoying benefits of assured procurement of their produce and 
higher prices. The study lists policy hurdles in scaling up the innovative models of 
vertical coordination in high-value food commodities.  
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1.  THE KEY ISSUES AND HYPOTHESES 
In most of South and Southeast Asia, and in much of sub-Saharan Africa, 
agriculture is dominated by smallholders, who derive their livelihoods by cultivating 
small pieces of land and supplementing their incomes with dairy, poultry or fish farming.  
And,  the number of such small-sized holdings has been steadily increasing under  the 
growing population pressure. For instance, in India, the share of smallholdings (< 2 ha) in 
the total number of holdings has increased from 70 percent in 1971 to 80 percent in 1995 
(GOI 2003). It is expected to reach 83 percent by 2010 (Jha 2001). In such a scenario, the 
fundamental issues that need to be looked into are:  Does the existing dominance of 
subsistence farming have some opportunities to bring them out of the low-income trap? 
Do smallholders have better income augmenting opportunities in high-value agriculture 
emanating from the unfolding process of rising income levels and growing urbanization, 
market liberalization and globalization?  
Earlier evidence from several developing countries indicates that such 
opportunities do exist for smallholders in the high-value food segment (Barghouti et al. 
2003; Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; von Braun 1995). In the Indian context, it has been  
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found that demand for and supply of high-value food commodities (e.g. fruits, vegetables, 
livestock and fisheries) have grown much faster than that for foodgrains (Kumar et al.  
2003; and Joshi et al. 2004). The share of high-value commodities in gross value of 
agricultural output has increased from 26 percent in 1981-82 to approximately 40 percent 
in 1999-2000. A question is often posed whether the smallholders would be able to 
participate in such a fast changing commercial agriculture. High-value commodities are 
often perishable in nature and generally feed the local markets that are usually thin and 
fragmented. Marketable surplus of an individual producer is too small to be bargained 
and traded remuneratively in distant markets due to high marketing and transaction costs 
(Delgado 1999; Escobal et al. 2000). Beside these problems, the prices of high-value food 
commodities are highly volatile.  All these factors escalate the transaction costs and 
increase risks in production and marketing considerably that may be discouraging for 
smallholders.  
The key issue that needs to be addressed is how smallholders can switch to high-
value food commodities with minimum transaction costs and market risks.  Experiences 
gained in developed countries and also in many developing countries in Southeast Asia, 
Africa and Latin America have revealed that various forms of institutions, such as 
cooperatives, producers’ associations and contract farming, have the potential to reduce 
transaction costs by vertically coordinating
3 production, marketing and processing 
(Warning and Key 2000; FAO 2001; Narayanan and Gulati 2002). In the Indian context, 
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with the exception of milk and sugar, vertical coordination through cooperatives is a 
recent phenomenon in high-value and perishable commodities. It is encouraging to note 
that such institutions are gradually emerging in niche areas and are successfully 
coordinating with the farmers in production and marketing of high-value food 
commodities (Asokan and Singh 2003). These institutions have attracted a lot of 
attention, and already professional debates have taken place on their role in distribution 
of benefits, particularly to smallholders.  
It is important to understand how firms coordinate with the farmers and what their 
implications are to smallholders. The present paper is an attempt in that direction. To be 
more precise, it intends to investigate such issues as (i) What are the processes adopted 
by different business houses in linking production and marketing of high-value food 
commodities?  (ii) What is their effect on transaction costs and farm profitability, 
especially from the point of view of smallholders? (iii) What are the various policy 
options that can be arrived at for strengthening vertical linkages between smallholders 
and the business houses?  Our key hypotheses is that the vertical coordination in high-
value food segment helps in lowering the transaction costs and market risks of 
smallholders.  
To test the hypotheses, we chose three important and most perishable high-value 
commodities viz., milk, broilers and vegetables in India. It may be mentioned that India is 
one of the largest producers of these commodities.  In 2001, India ranked first in 
production of milk (82 million tons) and fruits (49 million tons) (FAO 2002); second in 4 
vegetables
4 (68 million tons); and sixth in broiler production (1.4 million tons) (Landes et 
al. 2004). Unfortunately, these commodities are prone to high post-harvest losses and 
value-addition is woefully lacking in India.  Only about two percent of the production of 
fruits and vegetables, 15 percent of milk, and one percent out of the total of 4.5 million 
tons of meat are processed at commercial scale (GOI 2002). It is, therefore, essential that 
post-harvest losses are minimized and value-addition is increased by strengthening the 
farm-firm linkages. 
This paper consists of six sections. A brief introduction is followed by a 
theoretical development on the relationship between vertical coordination and transaction 
costs, and methodology adopted for estimation of transaction costs. The implications of 
vertical coordination on transaction costs and farm profitability are presented in section 
three.  In section four, the factors that influence producers’ participation in the emerging 
institutions have been examined. Policy impediments in replicating the successful models 
of vertical coordination are given in section five. And, in the last section, policy changes 
have been recommended to strengthen farm-firm linkages with a view to benefiting 
smallholders.  
2.  APPROACH, METHODS AND DATA  
A.  TRANSACTION COSTS  
Transaction costs are the costs incurred by trading partners associated with the 
exchange of goods and services. These include costs involved in collection of market 
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information, negotiations, monitoring and enforcement of business transaction (Jaffee 
and Morton 1995). In a perfectly competitive situation, institutions with the lowest 
production and transaction costs for a given activity will have an edge over others and 
dominate the market (Coase 1960; Williamson 1979 & 2001). The major factors 
influencing transaction costs and thereby the types of institution include asset-specificity, 
uncertainty, and externality. The more specialized is the asset, higher is the cost of its 
transferring to the next best use. Uncertainty influences the costs of searching 
information, screening, negotiation, bargaining and monitoring. Higher the uncertainty, 
higher is the cost of renegotiating the contract. The externality principle states that a firm 
will move from spot markets to vertical coordination if the participants in the adjacent 
markets impose deliberate or unintended negative externalities. In spot markets, 
producers are free to produce and sell any amount of any commodity and buyers are free 
to purchase any quantity from any seller. In contrast, full integration prevails in a 
situation of high asset-specificity and externality, and low uncertainty. The firm has 
complete control over production, marketing, processing and distribution. The 
intermediate institutional structures are cooperatives, producers’ associations, contract 
farming, etc. with a number of variants (Eaton and Shepherd 2001). 
B.   ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
Theoretical developments in transaction cost economics have been accompanied 
by very little empirical analysis due to measurement problems. De Janvry et al. (1991) 
and Williamson (1993) have suggested that the difference between selling and buying 
prices could serve as an approximation of the transaction costs. Some researchers have 6 
treated transportation costs (Fafchamps 1992; Omamo 1998) and the distance of sale 
point from the production site as proxies for transaction costs (Holloway et al. 2000). 
Some authors have classified transaction costs into tangible (transportation costs, 
communication costs, legal costs, etc.) and intangible (uncertainty, moral hazards, etc.) 
costs and have used proxies for these in the analysis of choice of markets (Hobbs 1997; 
Escobal 1999 and Holloway et al. 2000).  
This study has attempted to quantify tangible transaction costs incurred by the 
producers. Thus costs of travel, communication, transport and storage, loss in quality and 
quantity during transportation, credit, extension services, market fee, commission 
charges, and personnel time (own and hired) have been included. Except for the costs of 
own personnel time (human labor), all other costs are pecuniary costs. For the purpose of 
costing, own personnel time was evaluated at the existing market wages and was 
categorized as non-pecuniary component of transaction costs.  Benefits to the producers 
were estimated in terms of changes in the production and transaction costs due to 
institutional arrangements. Net profit was computed as the difference between the 
realized prices and the unit cost of production, including transaction costs.     
C. DATA 
Primary field surveys of contract and non-contract producers of milk, broilers and 
vegetables were conducted to gather information on their production and transaction 
costs. One firm for each of these commodities was identified to select the contract 
producers for the survey. These included Nestle India Limited-- a multinational firm for 7 
milk and milk products, Venkateshwara Hatcheries Limited (VHL)-- a private sector 
domestic firm engaged in contract broiler farming, and Mother Dairy Fruits and 
Vegetables Limited (MDFVL)-- a wholly owned subsidiary of public sector entity 
(namely, National Dairy Development Board), which sources fruits and vegetables 
through producers’ associations.  
The survey for the three case studies was undertaken in the year 2002-03 to 
collect the required information for the year 2001-02. The sample producers were 
interviewed to collect the required data, using pre-tested questionnaires, specifically 
prepared for each case study. Data from vegetable and milk producers was based on their 
memory and for broilers the recall was supplemented with the records maintained by both 
contract and non-contract producers. Detailed information was collected about the socio-
economic characteristics of the sample farmers, production-portfolio, item-wise and 
cycle-wise (in case of broilers) cost of production, yield levels, labor use, and cost of 
marketing and acquiring information for various activities. Information was also 
collected about marketing processes and item-wise cost of acquiring inputs and 
marketing output for both contract and non-contract producers. A brief description of 
each firm and sampling procedure is given below. 
The dairy farming activities of Nestle India Limited
5 are largely concentrated in 
the northwestern state of Punjab. The firm has its milk-processing factory at the town of 
Moga and sources raw milk from the districts of Moga, Ludhiana, Sangrur, Mukatsar, 
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236 million kg milk from over 85000 farmers in 1002 villages in 2001. (Dhaliwal, 2003).  8 
Ferozepur and Faridkot. These districts have been collectively referred to as ‘Moga Milk 
District’. A random sample of 152 producers
6 supplying milk regularly to Nestle was 
drawn from 12 villages of the Moga milk district. Selected villages were located in 
different directions around the factory in Moga within a radius of about 70 kilometers. In 
addition, 22 non-contract producers selling milk directly to the consumers and to the 
confectioneries in the nearby towns/cities were identified. The small sample size of non-
contract producers was due to the fact that an overwhelming majority of the commercial 
dairy farmers were selling milk to Nestle India Limited. 
Venkateshwara Hatcheries Limited
7 had started contract broiler farming 
operations during the mid-1990s in some southern and western states. The present study 
is confined to the southern state of Andhra Pradesh, which is a leading producer of 
poultry meat in the country. Unlike other agricultural activities, poultry production is 
widely dispersed. Both contract and  non-contract producers have a wide spatial 
dispersion. Therefore, a relatively small sample of 25 contract producers and an equal 
number of non-contract producers was randomly selected from 10 villages of 
Rangareddy, Mehboobnagar and Nalagonda districts in Andhra Pradesh.  
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7 The Venkateshwara Hatcheries (VH) group was established in 1971 as a franchise of Babcook Poultry 
Farm Inc., USA. In 1974, it established ‘Balaji Foods and Feeds Limited’ for processing of eggs into egg 
powder. Its broiler breed VENCOBB holds  60 percent  of the Indian market. The firm entered into contract 
farming during the mid-1990s. It has retail chain in major metros also where the fresh and frozen chicken 
and ready-to-cook frozen chicken are directly sold.  It also exports ready-to-eat chicken products. It has a 
business of about Rs. 1300 crore (approximately US$ 290 million) from poultry related products (Source: 
Poultry Line Vol. 2 (6): 2002).  9 
The third case study is on the Mother Dairy Fruits and Vegetables Limited
8 
(MDFVL) that integrates fruits and vegetable production through a retail chain in Delhi. 
Its procurement operations extend all over the country and are usually governed by the 
regional niches in production of specific commodities. Highly perishable commodities 
are procured from the nearby areas around Delhi. Two producers’ associations --- one in 
rural Delhi and the other in Sonepat district of Haryana (a state bordering Delhi) were 
identified for selection of contract producers. Each producers’ association covers 2-4 
villages and has 25 members. MDFVL also procures vegetables from non-members to 
meet the demand in their retail centers. Required information was collected from all the 
members (50) of these two associations. In addition, information was collected from 50 
randomly selected non-members, who were also supplying vegetables to MDFVL and 50 
producers who were selling vegetables in the open market. 
Marketing arrangements developed by these firms are different from those in the 
open market system. Unlike traditional marketing arrangements, these firms ensure 
procurement of contracted produce at the doorstep of the producers that enables them to 
save on transport, travel and labor costs. The firms also provide input services at 
wholesale rates and new technologies, which reduce the cost of production.  
                                                 
8 The firm was established in 1988 to meet the growing demand for fresh fruits and vegetables in Delhi 
metropolitan area with direct procurement from the farmers. It sells about 250 tons of fruits and vegetables 
everyday through its 279 retail outlets. The fresh fruits and vegetables are procured from 100 producers’ 
associations that cover 18000 growers. The producers’ associations are informal cooperatives or self-help 
groups managed by the producers themselves. About 75000 customers visit its retail outlets daily (Source: 
http://www.safalindia.com).   10 
3.  IMPLICATIONS OF INNOVATIVE INSTITUTIONS   
In this section implications of innovative institutions have been discussed on (i) 
profit and transaction costs, (ii) scale of operation, and (iii) output prices and risk sharing 
mechanism.   
A.  PROFIT AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
The key issue is to understand how the selected firms develop new institutional 
arrangements and benefit farmers in promoting high-value food commodities?  In this 
section, we have assessed the performance of new institutional arrangements in the 
supply chain of these selected perishable and high-value food commodities. Profits 
obtained and costs incurred by the farmers are regarded as indicators of performance for 
new institutional arrangements. The results reveal striking difference in the profits of 
contract and non-contract farmers for all the commodities under study (Figure 1). The 
contract farmers attained substantially higher net profit than the non-contract farmers. 
Milk contract farmers, for example, attained double the profit
9 than that of the non-
contract milk farmers. The corresponding profit difference was 78 percent for vegetable 
farmers and 13 percent for broiler farmers. Such a high difference in profit was attracting 
farmers to supply their raw material to the firm and thus was strengthening linkages in 
the evolving supply chain. It is evident that higher profit is one of the key motivations for 
the farmers to integrate with the firm(s) in supplying raw material(s).  
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was converted into 4 percent fat corrected milk (FCM), following Hemme et al. (2003).  11 
Figure 1—Net profit of contract and non-contract milk, broiler and vegetable 
producers 
 
The advantage that contract farmers had over non-contract farmers was mainly 
due to savings in production and marketing costs. And to verify this observation, 
production and transaction costs of milk, vegetables and broilers were estimated for 
contract and non-contract farmers. The results in Figure 2 clearly indicate that the total 
cost (production + transaction), of these commodities was much lower for contract than  
non-contract farmers. Details about costs and profit of contract farmers for milk, broilers 
and vegetables are given in Appendix I, II and III, respectively. The costs of milk 
production of contract farmers were less by approximately 21 percent in milk and 26 
































mainly attributed to lower transaction costs (Table 1). The share of transaction cost in 
total cost for non-contract farmers was 20 percent for milk and 21percent for vegetables; 
it was only 2 percent for contract farmers. Such a comparison was, however, not possible 
in the case of broilers, as the firm provided free chicks, feed and veterinary services to the 
contract farmers. However, the transaction cost was comparable, which was 58 percent 
less for contract farmers.  
Figure 2—Production and transaction cost of contract and non-contract farmers for 


































































Table 1—Production and transaction cost of milk, broiler and vegetable production 
in contract and non-contract farming (Rs/ton) 
 











Milk 5586  100  5686  5728  1442  7170 
Broiler* 808  38  846  27322  90  27412 
Vegetable** 1485  35  1520 1630  437  2067 
 
* For broiler, the firm provides free chicks, feed and medicines to the contract farmers. 
** Refers to spinach only. 
 
It was obvious that the contract farmers were taking advantage of new 
institutional arrangements that reduced the costs of their travel, transport of inputs and 
produce, access to information and new technology. In the case of milk and vegetables, 
the transaction costs were less on contract farms due to savings in time, transportation 
cost and labor cost for marketing of produce. These were mainly due to collection of 
these commodities by the firms from the producer’s village.  It may be concluded that 
access to market and information about new technology at negligible costs motivate 
farmers to participate in such evolving institutional arrangements.  
In the case of broiler, hardly any cost was incurred by the contract farmers on 
extension, communication and transportation for acquiring inputs. These costs were as 
high as 80 percent of the total transaction cost in broiler production.  The principal 
attraction for the broiler farmers for participating in the contractual arrangement was the 
availability of chicks, medicines and feed from the firm. These inputs accounted for 
about 75 percent in the total cost of broiler production and were the critical inputs for 
productivity and profitability. The firm bears mortality risk of 5 percent, and remaining is 14 
to be borne by the producer. This means that broiler contract farmers were enjoying 
indirect credit for important inputs without any interest and, transferring some risks to the 
firm. This may perhaps be the  main attraction to the farmers, particularly smallholders, 
for establishing strong links with the broiler firm.  
Reduction in transaction costs through vertical coordination is beneficial to the 
firm and the farmers mutually. The firm gets an assured and timely supply of the desired 
raw material. It helps the firm in having a  better control over its operational and fixed 
costs and minimizing the risk on account of underutilization of its capacity; thus 
eventually minimizing the cost of processing. It also enables the firm to improve its 
market reputation. On the other side, the farmers get assured market for their produce that 
is otherwise not possible on a regular basis. Greater access to market improves the 
farmers’ capacity to withstand risks arising out of production and price fluctuations. 
Besides they have a more reliable access to production inputs, capital, technology and 
information. Such a win-win situation was found to have remarkably increased farmers’ 
participation in contract farming in niche areas and commodities; 76 percent of vegetable 
farmers and 56 percent of broiler farmers had expanded their scale of operation between 
1990 and 2000. Non-contract vegetable and broiler farmers also expanded their scale of 
operation but only at a lower level, by 54 and 44 percent farmers, respectively. Such a 
noticeable expansion by the contract farmers revealed that they were gaining from the 
innovative arrangements made for production and marketing.    15 
B. SCALE  EFFECTS 
There have been apprehensions that smallholders would not be able to take full 
advantage of the new institutional arrangements (Glover 1987; Watts 1994; Key and 
Runsten 1999).  These arguments are based on the fears that firms in order to reduce their 
transaction costs (such as distribution of inputs, credit and extension services) may be 
inclined to have a tie-up with a few large farmers rather than dealing with a large number 
of scattered smallholders. Another factor that supports contracting with large landholders 
is their better capacity to invest in production-related inputs, technology information, and 
ability to withstand risks. However, large farmers have better access to market 
information and strong bargaining power that might add to the firm’s transaction costs.  
To examine the state of affairs of smallholders
10 and their linkages with the firms, 
a disaggregated analysis was carried out based on the size of farms for vegetable 
production and scale of operations for milk and broilers. The distribution of smallholders 
in the sample clearly showed that they were well represented in the contractual 
arrangements in the three case studies (Table 2). The doubt that the firm may ignore and 
discriminate against smallholders did not have any ground. To take advantage of 
economies of scale, dairy and vegetable firms were contracting through producers’ 
associations rather than dealing directly with individual farmers. The milk and vegetable  
                                                 
10 For milk, smallholders were considered as those who had milk animals up to 5; while farmers having 
milk animals between 6 and 10 were characterized as medium, and more than 10, as large farmers.  
For broilers, those had up to 5000 birds per cycle were defined as small farmers, and the ones with 5000-
10,000 birds as medium, and with more than 10,000 birds as large farmers. For vegetables, small farmers 
were those who had land less than 2 ha, and those having land between 2-4 ha as medium, and with more 
than 4 ha land, as large farmers.    16 
firms had organized farmers into groups or cooperative associations for activities such as 
procurement of inputs, technical advice, facilitating credit needs, collecting output, etc. 
Such a mechanism has helped the firm in overcoming the difficulties faced in 
approaching too many scattered smallholders individually. It eventually could help in 
controlling escalation in transaction costs. 
 
Table 2—Distribution of sample farmers associated with contract farming (percent) 
 
Commodity Small  Medium  Large 
Dairy  56 27 17 
Poultry  32 32 36 
Vegetable  37 36 27 
 
It was well established that contract farmers, irrespective of size of the farms, 
were producing milk, broilers and vegetables at a lower cost and were attaining higher 
profits than the non-contract farmers (Figure 3; Table 3). The smallholders could save 
approximately 28 percent cost in vegetable production and 20 percent in milk production 
as a result of contract farming. The corresponding savings in case of large farmers were 
22 percent and 14 percent, respectively. This reduction in cost was mainly due to lower 
transaction costs (Tables 4 and 5). Large framers have lower transaction costs. However, 
there existed some variance from this trend for contract vegetable producers, where the 
transaction costs was higher for large farmers. The main reason for such a variance was 
because of higher transportation cost from production to collection center. The pecuniary 
cost of production (that excluded family labor) of smallholders was however lower than 
that of large farmers. It was observed that by and large the pecuniary costs increased with 17 
higher scale of business, while non-pecuniary costs (mainly family labor) showed a 
decline (Table 6). However, some anomaly was observed in the trend. For example, the 
pecuniary cost decreased for broiler production when moving from medium to large 
producer, and for vegetables when moving from small to medium. The issue needs more 
investigations to decipher such anomaly to generalize the pattern in pecuniary cost vis-à-
vis size of farm. However, our analysis showed that the lower pecuniary cost on large 
farms for broiler production was due to economies of scale in use of electricity, bulbs, 
disinfectants, and higher body weight per bird as compared to medium farms. For 
vegetable production, medium farmers take advantage of irrigation and packaging costs. 
Smallholders are sufficiently endowed with own family labor, whereas large farmers 
generally depend on hired labor that needs to be effectively monitored, adding to their 
production cost. That was why large farmers preferred to select labor-saving production 
portfolio unless cheap and timely labor was available. It was corroborated clearly by the 
vegetable case study, wherein a marked difference was observed in area allocated to 
vegetables by small and large farmers. In the sample households, the smallholders 
allocated 57 percent area to vegetables as compared to 34 percent by the large farmers 
(Table 7).  18 









































(b) over total cost
Small Medium Large19 
 
Table 3 —Farm size-wise unit cost of production and profit in milk, broiler and  
                  vegetable of contract and non-contract producers (Rs/ton) 
 







  Unit cost of production (Rs/ton) 
Small  6266  7797  1022 27692 1522  2127 
Medium  5489 6901  848 27854  1486 1985 
Large  5475 6394  812 27052  1531 1958 
All  5686 7170  846 27412  1520 2067 
  Net profit over total cost (Rs/ton) 
Small  2446  866  2238 2087 1818  920 
Medium  3745 2081 2273 2058 1809 1122 
Large  4329 3604 2261 1934 1792 1167 
All  3651 1821 2255 2003 1791 1007 
  Net profit over pecuniary cost (Rs/ton) 
Small  4170 3229 2708 2328 2309 1532 
Medium  4622 3881 2308 2136 2287 1659 
Large  4892 4932 2266 1972 2215 1628 
All  4606 3720 2318 2107 2267 1585 
Net profit over total cost (%) 
Small  39.04 11.11  218.98 7.54 119.45  43.25 
Medium  68.23 30.16  268.04 7.39 121.74  56.52 
Large  79.07 56.37  278.45 7.15 117.05  59.60 
All  64.21 25.40  266.55 7.31 117.87  48.72 
 
*  In the case of broilers, the unit cost of production of contract producers is low because it does not include 
the cost of chick, feed and medicine, which are supplied by the firm free of cost. 
**  Refers to spinach. 
 
 
Table 4—Share of transaction cost in total cost of milk and vegetable production 
and marketing under different farm sizes (percent) 
 
Contract farmers  Non-contract farmers  Farm Size 
Milk Vegetables  Milk  Vegetable 
Small 3.27  2.23  24.50  23.84 
Medium 1.51  0.54  17.62  17.48 
Large 1.17  3.00  14.72  13.94 
All 1.76  2.30  20.11  21.14 
 
 20 
Table 5—Transaction cost of different farm sizes for broilers’ production and 
marketing (Rs/ton) 
 
Size Contract  Non-contract  Difference  (%) 
Small 59  142  58.5 
Medium 37  81  54.3 
Large 34  65  47.7 





Table 6—Pecuniary and non-pecuniary cost of production and marketing of milk, 
broilers and vegetables in different farm size of contract producers 
(Rs/ton) 
 
Farm Size  Milk  Broiler*  Vegetable** 
  Pecuniary cost (Rs/ton) 
Small 4542  552  1031 
Medium 4612  813  1008 
Large 4912  807  1078 
All 4731  783  1044 
  Non-Pecuniary Cost (Rs/ton) 
Small 1724  470  491 
Medium 877  35  478 
Large 563  5  453 
All 955  63  476 





Table 7—Share of vegetable area in gross cropped area in different category of 
farms (%) 
 
Farm size  Contract farmers  Non-contract farmers 
Small 57  57 
Medium 54  38 
Large 34  27 
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These facts revealed that smallholders were neither being deprived of their 
participation in contract farming nor were being exploited by the firms. The smallholders 
could minimize their transaction costs and increase their income by participating in 
contract farming. The savings in transaction cost were mainly on account of marketing 
their small produce, acquiring inputs and easy access to improved technology through 
contract farming. As regard production, smallholders had the comparative advantage of 
utilizing their own family labor, while for marketing their produce, they were taking 
advantage of the firm, which ensured procurement of perishable commodities at 
remunerative prices. Contrary to the argument favoring contracting of firms with large 
farmers, it was observed that the firms were finding it more convenient and beneficial to 
contract with smallholders and their associations. There were four obvious reasons for it: 
(i) Less effect on overall supply in the event of crop failure of one or few farmers 
(idiosyncratic risk); (ii) More flexible production portfolio (due to limited fixed assets 
and more family labor) of smallholders, which would help in quickly responding to 
consumers’ changing preferences; (iii) Smallholders could ensure better quality as they 
strictly comply with the production practices advised by the firm mainly due to more 
family labor and lower bargaining power; and (iv) Low marketable surplus of 
smallholders increases their dependency on the firm for profit maximization. 
C.  PRICE AND RISK SHARING 
There have been apprehensions that the contract farming would ultimately lead to 
monopsonic situation and could exploit farmers (Glover 1987; Little and Watts 1994). 
Such a situation arises when the market is not competitive and one of the trading partners 22 
acts opportunistically to exploit the farmers. To verify this phenomenon, we compared 
the prices offered to contract farmers with those in the prevailing market. We observed 
that the contract farmers were being offered relatively higher prices than the prevailing 
market prices. In case of vegetables, the contract farmers received 8 percent higher 
prices, mainly for a   better quality and as an incentive for ensuring a regular supply.  In 
case of vegetables, the prices offered to the farmers were determined by the prevailing 
prices in the Delhi Fruit & Vegetable Market (one of the largest trading markets for fruits 
& vegetables in India) with a premium of 5-20 percent above this benchmark price, 
depending upon commodity and quality. In case of milk, the prices were determined on 
the basis of SNF and fat content. Since the milk market is highly competitive, there was 
only a marginal price premium (4 percent) for the contract farmers over the prevailing 
market prices. In the case of broilers, the prices were fixed by BROMARK
11. 
Nevertheless, the firm shared additional profits due to rise in market prices with the 
farmers. Also, the firm offered an incentive of 25 percent for a better feed-conversion 
ratio. In all these case studies, we did not observe any kind of monopsonic behavior to 
exploit farmers.  Also the existence of perfect competition in these markets did   not 
allow any of these firms to trade in exceptionally large volumes and control the market.   
Sharing of risk between the producer and firm is another advantage in the case of 
broiler industry. The firm bears full market risks. It is important because broiler prices are 
often faced with high price-volatility that affects profit considerably. Both the parties 
share the production risk depending on its nature and magnitude. The mortality risk up to 
                                                 
11 BROMARK is an apex organization of the different stakeholders in broiler production.   23 
5 percent of the chicks is considered to be natural and is borne by the firm. For mortality 
exceeding 5 percent, the firm charges Rs. 0.10/kg of live body weight of the grown-up 
broiler for every one percent increase in the mortality. Such a risk-sharing mechanism 
provides protection to the producers, particularly the smallholders, under volatile market 
conditions.  
The implications of risk-sharing mechanism on profit and yield of contract and 
non-contract farmers were examined by computing the Coefficient of Variation (CV) in 
different cycles. The striking differences in CV of profits between contract and non-
contract farmers are evident from Table 8. Whereas the CV of profit of contract farmers 
was almost stable over different cycles, it was very high with sharp fluctuations for non-
contract farmers. Since there was only marginal difference in CV of yield between 
contract and non-contract farmers, the price volatility in case of broilers was the major 
reason for high variability in profits. It can also be seen that the CV of yield was higher 
for non-contract farmers during March-April and May-June periods. This was because of 
higher temperature during these periods, which had resulted in high mortality rate. 
Ramaswami et al. (2004) have estimated that contracting in broiler industry could shift 
about 88 percent of risk from the farmer to the processor. Such a risk-sharing mechanism 
helps contract farmers, particularly the smallholders in improving their management 
strategies and minimizing production and price risks. Experiences in the past have 
revealed that high risk in production and prices had led to the closure of several poultry 
farms. Alternatively, poultry farmers were gradually shifting to contract farming.  No 
analogous risk-sharing mechanism was found in case of milk and vegetable production.  24 
 
Table 8—Cycle-wise coefficient of variation (CV) in yield and profit of broiler in 
contract and non-contract farming (percent) 
 









January-February 10  8  22  65 
March-April 8  16  20  137 
May-June 5  22  22  296 
July-August 20  21  20  270 
September-October 9  7  26  107 
November-December 8  7  26 49 
 
* One cycle completes in 38 days from one-day old chick to fully matured for meat. 
** CV of broiler yield and net profit for each cycle is over different farms. 
 
The study clearly showed that the speculation of monopsonic behavior by the firm 
did not exist.  On the contrary, farmers were enjoying benefits of assured procurement of 
their produce and higher prices, even though prices could be higher marginally. 
Generally, in the absence of assured prices, farmers opt for low risk crops. Empirical 
evidence suggested that farmers were averse to risk and even were ready to pay a 
premium (lower product prices) for guaranteed income schemes (Binswanger 1980; 
Hazell 1982). In our case studies, assured prices and market access were encouraging 
farmers to diversify agriculture towards high-value and perishable commodities. Such a 
mechanism, which insures the farmer against price risk, benefits the firm also in terms of 
assured supply and better quality of raw material.  25 
4.  DETERMINANTS OF FARMERS’ PARTICIPATION  
The firms under study do not discriminate in choosing members for contractual 
arrangements unless a producer is highly indebted. All the firms under study open the 
membership in their area of operation. However, it is producers’ socio-economic 
characteristics that influenced their decision to participate in contract farming. A clear 
understanding of these factors would help in upscaling of the contract farming models for 
promoting high-value food commodities. We have used logit model to identify those 
characteristics that influence producers’ participation in contract farming. The structural 
form of the model is given in Equation (1):  
 
Ci =  δ1 + δ2 Zi + μi     (1) 
 
where,  Ci  is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the farmer participates in the 
contract program, and 0 otherwise. Zi is a vector of independent variables, and includes 
factors like schooling, age, labor availability, ownership of assets, experience in 
particular commodity, etc.; δ1 and δ2 are the estimated parameters, while μi is the error- 
term. The selected variables in the model are described below.  
It was hypothesized that availability of family labor, non-farm income, 
smallholdings and higher education and age of the household would have a positive 
effect on the decision to participate in contractual arrangements. It was expected that 
households with greater surplus labor were more likely to join contract farming schemes 
because of labor-intensive nature of the commodities contracted. Producers having 26 
income from non-farm sources were also more likely to participate in contract schemes 
due to lesser experience in farming and/or want of time for marketing.  On asset 
specificity, it was considered that greater the asset specificity, higher would be the 
probability of participation in contract farming due to higher transaction cost. Further, on 
the basis of experience in commercial farming it was hypothesized that the less 
experienced producers would participate more eagerly in the contract farming. Similarly, 
a person with higher education level was expected to have a better access to information 
and more clarity about emerging institutions.  An elder person being less mobile was 
expected to participate much more in schemes that made marketing available at his 
doorsteps. The definitions and hypothesized values of the socio-economic variables 
included in the model are outlined in Appendix IV.  
The results of the logit model are reported in Table 9. By and large, the income 
from non-farm sources and experience in particular production activity were influencing 
producers’ decision to participate in contract farming. Other variables included in the 
model were non-significant. It was interesting to note that income from non-farm sources 
had a positive and significant influence on producers’ participation in the case of milk 
and vegetable contract farming. It was obvious  that greater focus on non-farm activities, 
and scarcity of time encouraged the producers to participate in those institutions that 
could facilitate acquiring inputs and disposing of outputs. Contract farming offers such 
opportunities.   27 
Table 9—Factors influencing participation in contract farming in milk, broilers and 
vegetable production: results of logit function 
 
Variable Milk  Broiler  Vegetable 















































Chi-squared 23.0731***  20.2485***  19.2960*** 
Number of observations  176  50  132 
 
*** significant at 1 percent probability level; ** significant at 5 percent probability level; and * significant  
       at 10 percent probability level.  
Figures within  the parentheses are standard errors. 
 
 
Producers’ experience in different activities yielded mixed results.  While 
experiences of milk and vegetable producers had a positive impact on participation in 
contract farming, broiler producers were found to have gradually withdrawn from 
contract farming with more experience. It was because the processes of acquiring inputs 
and disposal of output were observed to be almost similar for contract and non-contract 
broiler farming. The key inputs (chicks, feed and medicines) were being delivered at the 
farm and output was being lifted from the farm, irrespective of contractual arrangements. 
Under such arrangements, contract as well as non-contract broiler producers could save 
on transportation and marketing costs. Therefore, broiler producers, after acquiring some 28 
experience in production and marketing, gradually withdrew from contract farming to 
trade independently in the open market. On the contrary, milk and vegetable producers 
who opted out from contractual arrangement had no such advantage.  The transaction 
costs for milk and vegetables non-contract producers escalate as their volume of 
marketable surplus is too small. It has already been discussed earlier that the transaction 
costs for milk and vegetable contract producers are significantly lower than for non-
contract producers.   
An attempt was also made to predict the shifting of non-contract producers to the 
contract mode and vice-versa. The actual and predicted frequencies revealed that given 
the opportunity an overwhelming majority of the non-contract milk producers (86 
percent) and vegetable producers (65 percent) would switch over to contract mode of 
production. But in the case of broiler farming, only 24 percent of the non-contract 
producers would opt for contract farming. The probability of change from contract to 
independent production was extremely low in case of dairy and vegetable production and 
high in broiler farming. The basis for such a shift has been explained earlier, viz., 
‘contract producers learn rules of the game with experience and opt out for independent 
production’. 
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5.  POLICY CONSTRAINTS IN EXPANDING VERTICAL COORDINATION 
The study has clearly revealed that strengthening farm-firm linkages through new 
institutional arrangements is mutually beneficial for the producers and the firms. Despite 
substantial reduction in transaction costs and improvement in marketing efficiency, such 
farm-firm linkage models replicate at a very slow rate. Among others, there are many 
policy and infrastructure obstacles in evolving new institutional arrangements. After 
discussions with the representatives of the firms, the important ones are enumerated 
below: 
•  High-value food commodities require an infrastructure that is quite different from 
that of cereals and pulses. Most of the high-value food commodities being 
perishable in nature, which require refrigerated transportation and cold storages at 
every stage of value addition. These are, however, woefully lacking. Cold storage 
facilities are inadequate. There are nearly 4600 cold storages in India with a 
capacity of about 18 million tons which cater to less than 10 percent of the 
produce. Over 80 percent of this is used for potatoes alone. Hence, there are 
substantial post-harvest losses. 
•  One important requirement for successful coordination of value-addition and 
agro-processing is a regular supply of good quality raw material from farm to 
firm. This can be achieved through either self-production by the firm or contract 
farming. The existing land ceiling act restricts the first option, while the latter is 
not possible unless the government enacts appropriate legislation. As on date, 
none of the options has a legal standing; which is a discouragement to contract 30 
farming. Apart from this, no legislation exists for a breach of contract by any 
party (farmer or the firm).  
•  In many states, the by-laws of the market committee legislation restrict the sale 
within a specified area. Market fee including commission charges are high; 
ranging from 2 to 7 percent. Some states also impose developmental charges. 
Transfer of goods outside the defined geographical boundaries attracts imposition 
of sales tax, octroi, etc. Such restrictions distort the market, reduce its efficiency 
and discourage formation of farm-firm linkages through contract farming.    
•  Promotion of agro-processing industry may provide a fillip to contract farming of 
high-value food commodities. However, this sector is afflicted with various 
ailments like (i) scale of industry, (ii) over bureaucratization  and complicated 
legal wrangles, and (iii) high taxes. Scale of industry and its operation affect the 
production efficiency of processing firms. Until recently a number of food 
products were reserved for Small-Scale Industries (SSIs), which often lack 
capital, use obsolete technology,  are inefficient in production and weak in 
marketing, and not have any incentive to develop effective farm-firm linkages for 
reducing their transaction costs. Realizing the importance of scale of industry in 
agro-processing, the Government of India has recently taken-off some of the  food 
items reserved for SSIs. In a competitive environment it would have been difficult 
for the  SSIs to take advantage of the new technologies and economies of scale in 
production and marketing, both in domestic and international market. 31 
•  Existing bureaucratic and cumbersome procedures discourage the potential agro-
processors to venture to this promising business. There are about 17 laws 
governing the food industry. There are laws that govern a specific commodity or a 
group of commodities. And, there are separate laws relating to weights and 
measurements, packaging, adulteration, etc. These laws are administered and 
implemented by different departments and/or ministries. As for instance, 
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 is implemented by the Ministry of 
Health; Agriculture Produce (Grading and Marking) Act by the Ministry of Rural 
Development; laws related to standards, weights and measurements are under the 
jurisdiction of Ministry of Civil Supplies, Consumer Affairs and Public 
Distribution and the laws related to environment are implemented by the Ministry 
of Environment and Forests. For setting up a agro-processing unit an investor has 
to get clearance from all the concerned departments. Such a multiplicity often 
results in conflicting approaches, lack of coordination and administrative delays. 
•  Despite fiscal reforms, excise duty and sales tax imposed on processed foods 
continue to remain high. This pushes-up the market prices of processed food 
items, which would be naturally much higher than the fresh food. The excise duty 
on processed meat, fish and poultry products was reduced to 8 percent in the 2004 
budget from a high of 16 percent in 2003. Certain processed dairy, fruits and 
vegetable products have no excise duty. Excise duty on cakes and pastries is 16 
percent. Other levies, like sales tax, octroi, market fee etc, are state subjects and 
vary from state to state. In general, sales tax is about 10 percent. The approach 32 
paper towards formulation of national food processing industries by the Ministry 
of Food Processing, Government of India, prepared before 2004 central budget 
put all the levies (including central excise duty) between 21 to 23 percent. 
(MOFPI 2004) The paper also states that India is the only country to levy excise 
duty on machinery and equipment for processed foods. Compared to many other 
countries, this tax burden is high. Comparative tax burden is 10 percent in 
Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, 14-15 percent in Netherlands and United 
Kingdom, 17 percent in China and Ireland. (CIFTI 2002). 
•  Rising demand for food and non-food processed products has provided expanding 
opportunities for the growth of their organized retailing that hitherto had 
comprised only about 2 percent of the total retail sales in India. This has attracted 
some large domestic business groups such as Tatas (Westside), RPG 
(FoodWorld), Rahejas (Shopper’s Stop) and Piramal (Pyramids and Crossroads) 
into food retail trade. Some of these retail food chains are sourcing raw materials 
directly from the farmers through vertical coordination (Chengappa et al. 2003). 
The organized retailing is concentrated mainly in the southern metropolis. That is 
why a silent revolution of innovative institutions is so evidently visible in the 
southern states of India.  The organized retailing should be encouraged to improve 
marketing efficiency and profit-sharing with producers and consumers.   
The Government of India has undertaken several steps to overcome some of the 
constraints in agricultural marketing and agro-processing sector, particularly after the 
regulatory and fiscal reforms have been introduced to attract private investment in food 33 
industry (Government of India 2002).  Among others, a series of economic reforms 
program started in early 1990s.  These include (i) doing away with the industrial 
licensing requirement for most of the food items, (ii) automatic approval of investment up 
to 51 percent foreign equity or 100 percent for Non-Resident Indians, (iii) relaxation in 
monopoly and foreign exchange acts, (iv) free import and export of food items (except 
items on the negative list) and capital goods, and (v) permission to financial institutions 
to finance contract farming schemes strengthening backward linkages. The fiscal 
incentives include: (i) reduction in import and excise duty and corporate taxes, and 
repatriation of benefits, (ii) establishment of free trade, and export processing zones, (iii) 
reduction in custom duty on imports of capital goods, and exemption from corporate and 
minimum alternative taxes to the firms located in free trade and export processing zones.  
The Government of India has recently initiated a scheme to strengthen farm-firm 
linkages in which reimbursement up to 10 percent of the total purchase by the processor 
is allowed limited to Rs 1 million (approximately US$ 22.5 thousand) a year.  The 
assistance is also provided for the market survey and brand promotion up to 50 percent of 
the cost of campaign, limited to Rs 5 million (approximately US$ 112.5 thousand). These 
measures are slowly attracting the organized sector to participate in strengthening of 
farm-firm linkages and evolving different innovative institutional models.   
Agriculture being a state subject in India, some state governments too have taken 
initiatives to facilitate/encourage entry of the private/corporate sector to agriculture. As 
for example, Tamil Nadu has come out with a policy document on contract farming. 
Industries promoting cultivation of fruits and vegetables through value-addition have 34 
been exempted from land ceiling act. In addition, provisions have been made to lease 
degraded forestlands and wastelands to the private sector for cultivation of plantation 
crops with state as a partner. Under the policy, the state provides a capital subsidy up to 
20 percent of the fixed assets (green house structures, irrigation and fertilizer equipments, 
cold room, tissue culture, etc.) subject to a ceiling of Rs 2 million (approximately US$ 45 
thousand) to fruit and vegetable industries. The fruit and vegetable industry has been 
given the status of an industry, enabling it to get preferential treatment in power supply. 
Punjab has also aggressively launched contract farming to replace the existing rice-wheat 
system. In some other states, including Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, 
incentives and other mechanisms to attract private investment in agriculture through 
contract farming have been worked out.  Market fee (2-7 percent) has been exempted in 
these states for producers who sell their produce directly to the processors. Consequently, 
some well-known agro-processing players like Hindustan Lever Limited, Nestle India 
Limited, Britannia Industries, Pepsi Co, Rallis India Limited, Escorts, Mahindra & 
Mahindra, and Venkateshwara Hatcheries have started adopting ‘innovative institutional 
arrangements’ as a means of sourcing raw materials directly from the farmers. 
It may be concluded that the present policy environment and infrastructure 
network are inadequate for promoting vertical coordination and encouraging agro-
processing sector.  The scattered attempts made in this direction are showing promising 
results and they need to be replicated in niche areas. It appears that the private sector is 
keen to invest in agriculture and agro-processing sector to harness the huge untapped 
potential but the existing policies are discouraging it from venturing into these areas. It is 35 
high time the private sector is encouraged to evolve new institutional arrangements to 
take advantage of the opportunities emerging from trade liberalization. The government 
should ensure that smallholders are not left behind in sharing the benefits of the emerging 
opportunities.   
6. CONCLUSIONS   
We have examined the institutional mechanisms adopted by different firms to 
integrate small producers of milk, broilers and vegetables in the supply chain and their 
effects on producers’ transaction costs and farm profitability. The institutions under study 
have covered contracting with farmers in case of milk and broilers and producers’ 
associations in case of vegetables. The models adopted in the three case studies have 
shown certain similarities and some dissimilarities in their approach as well as terms and 
conditions. A common feature is that they provide technical support for production and 
ensure an assured market to the producers. Dissimilarities too are many. In broiler 
farming, the firm contributes in terms of major inputs and exercises considerable control 
over the production process, whereas in the case of dairying and vegetable production, 
the firm hardly has any influence on producers’ decisions. Further, in contract broiler 
farming, the firm pays fixed growing charges thus protecting producers from the price 
risks, whereas in the case of dairying and vegetable production, the entire price risk is 
borne by the producers.  
Nevertheless, the effect of these institutional arrangements on producers’ 
transaction costs and farm profitability has been found enormous. Transaction cost as a 
result of contract farming has been reduced by over 90 percent in the case of milk and 36 
vegetables, and 58 percent in the case of broilers. The net revenue realization by contract 
producers has been 2 to 4 times higher in milk and vegetables and 1.1 times in broilers. It 
is observed that smallholders have benefited most from such arrangements as they have 
low marketable surplus and their marketing costs are extremely high.  
The criticism against contract farming schemes for their bias against small 
producers has not been found true. Evidence from the case studies has indicated 
considerable involvement of smallholders in such schemes. We have also examined the 
criticism against contracting firms on their tendency to extract monopsonistic rent in the 
output market. This too has not been supported by the results of this study; rather the 
contract farmers have been receiving relatively higher prices (4-25%) than the non-
contract farmers. Many contract farming schemes have in-built provision of credits to 
small producers to ease their capital constraints and some critics argue that by doing so 
the firm may make producers excessively dependent on it for credit and thus keep them 
in perpetual indebtedness (Watts 1994; Runsten and Key 1996). In the case studies, we 
have not come across such type of perpetual indebtness as a result of contract farming.   
Based on the empirical analysis of the three models of vertical coordination, the 
study suggests the following future policy directions: 
•  By linking production with marketing the firms contribute in developing 
markets for high-value food commodities, which hitherto are thin, fragmented 
and thus exploitative. Contrary to the general perception, the smallholders 
gain substantially as a result of new institutional arrangements. Therefore, any 
effort for promoting vertical coordination in high-value food commodities 37 
would not only augment income of smallholders but would also generate 
employment opportunities in the rural areas.  
•  Many institutions provide free extension and support services to the producers 
as part of the contract. The public extension system has been under criticism 
for its inefficiency in delivery of services and rising burden on public 
exchequer (Ahuja et al. 2000; Sulaiman and Sadamate 2000), and 
governments are, in fact, looking for alternative cost-effective extension 
models. Institutions such as contract farming and cooperatives can be 
considered as models to facilitate the process of privatization of public 
extension services at no cost to the public exchequer.  
•  Many firms have started undertaking agricultural research, which was limited 
so far, to achieve the desired attributes of raw material and acquire 
competitive edge.  These developments of agribusiness activities could 
improve the interface between private and public sector research, and is a 
welcome augury. For example, Safal provides technical awareness and 
training to its members on how to grow chemical free vegetables through 
Integrated Pest Management. Similarly, the Venkateshwara Hatcheries 
Limited provides best breeds of chicks and Nestle India Limited arranges 
breeding and veterinary services.  
•  Many contracting firms arrange for credit and insurance (in terms of risk 
sharing) for producers which is in the interest of the firms also. In poor 
economies where markets for these products are still underdeveloped and 38 
imperfect, such schemes have the potential to ease capital constraint on the 
public exchequer and provide protection against risk and uncertainty.  
•  For many firms, the vertical coordination is a means of sustaining/improving 
their export earnings through continuous improvements in value-addition at 
every stage. In this pursuit, these firms educate producers also about the 
quality aspects such as Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) issues that are 
becoming important in international trade.  
•  In countries like India where the existing infrastructure for agro-processing is 
inadequate, but demand for processed food is increasing, multiplier effect of 
institutional and infrastructure development in terms of income and 
employment generation in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors would 
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Appendix I—Production and transaction costs of and net profit from milk under 
contract and non-contract farming mode  
 
Item Contract  Non-contract  %  Difference  t-statistic 
No. of in-milk bovines  7.3  5.3  37.7  2.067** 
Milk yield (kg/in-Milk Animal)  11.9  11.4  4.4  0.955 
Marketed surplus (%)  84.9  83.0  1.9  0.722 
Cost of production (Rs/ton)    
   Pecuniary  4694  4535  3.5  0.668 
   Non-pecuniary  892  1193  -25.2  2.027** 
   Total  5586  5728  -2.5  0.449 
Transaction cost (Rs /ton)    
   Pecuniary  37  736  -95.0  10.734*** 
   Non-pecuniary  63  706  -91.1  5.867*** 
   Total  100  1442  -93.1  7.876*** 
Total cost (Rs /ton)    
   Pecuniary  4731  5271  -10.2  2.258** 
   Non-pecuniary  955  1899  -49.7  4.692*** 
   Total  5686  7170  -20.7  4.182*** 
Milk price (Rs /ton)  9337  8991  3.8  1.165 
Net profit (Rs /ton)    
   Over pecuniary cost  4606  3720  23.8  2.129** 
   Over total cost  3651  1821  100.5  3.415*** 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 % respectively. 
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Appendix II—Production and transaction costs of and net benefits from broilers 
under contract and non-contract farming  
 
 





Number of producer households  25  25     
Number of chicks placed per crop (cycle)  8149  6891  18.3  0.746 
Number of production cycles/year   5.6  5.8  -2.8  0.879 
Mean length of the production cycle (days)  42.3  48.4  -12.6  7.106*** 
Mortality rate (percent)  4.8  4.4  8.7  0.737 
Body weight (kg/bird)  1.78  1.79  -0.6  0.128 
Feed conversion rate (kg feed/kg body weight)   1.9  2.2  -14.3  3.186*** 
Marketed surplus (percent)  100.0  99.9    - 
Cost of production (Rs/ton body weight)      - 
     Pecuniary  746  27227  -  - 
     Non-pecuniary  62  95  -  - 
     Total  808  27322  -  - 
Transaction costs (Rs/ton body weight)      
     Pecuniary   37  81  -54.3  2.939*** 
     Non-pecuniary  1  9  -88.9  - 
     Total   38  90  -57.8.  3.146*** 
Total costs (Rs/ton body weight)      
     Pecuniary  783  27308  -  - 
     Non-pecuniary  63  104  -  - 
     Total cost  846  27412  -  - 
Gross profit (Rs/ton body weight)  3101  29415 - - 
    Fixed growing charges/sale of broilers  2500  28792  -  - 
    Net incentive/penalty   79  0  -  - 
    Total from broilers  2579  28792  -  - 
    Sale of poultry manure  372  434  -  - 
    Sale of empty feed bags  150  189  -  - 
Net profit from broilers (Rs/ton body weight)     -  
    Over pecuniary costs  1796  1484  21.0  1.272 
    Over total costs  1733  1380  25.6  1.437 
 Net profit from all (Rs /ton body weight)      
    Over pecuniary costs  2318  2107  10.0  0.922 
    Over total costs  2255  2003  12.6  1.107 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 % respectively. 
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Appendix III—Production and transaction costs of and net profit from vegetables 
(spinach) under contract and non-contract farming 
 
Item Contract  farmers  Non-contract 
farmers 
% Difference  t-statistic 
Crop yield (ton/ha)  8.6  8.3  4.0  0.954 
Cost of production (Rs/ton)       
    Pecuniary   1020  1171  -12.9  2.063** 
    Non-pecuniary  465  459  1.3  0.266 
    Total  1485  1630  -8.9  1.588 
Transaction cost (Rs/ton)       
    Pecuniary   24  318  -92.5  6.583*** 
    Non-pecuniary  11  119  -90.8  5.356*** 
    Total  35  437  -92.0  6.637*** 
Total cost: production (Rs/ton)       
    Pecuniary   1044  1489  -29.8  5.606*** 
    Non-pecuniary  476  578  -17.5  2.846*** 
    Total  1520  2067  -26.5  5.663*** 
Price (Rs/ton)  3311  3074  7.7  2.303** 
Net profit (Rs/ton)       
    Over pecuniary costs  2267  1586  42.9  4.453*** 
    Over total cost  1791  1007  77.9  4.727*** 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 % respectively. 
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Appendix  IV—Selected characteristics of contract and non-contract producers  
 
Variable Definition  Hypothesis 
Age of the household  Age in years of the household makes decision  + 
Schooling  of  the  household  Schooling years of the household makes 
decision 
+ 
Experience in particular 
activity 
Experience in years of producing particular 
commodity 
+/- 
Land size  Size of land holding in ha  - 
Total stock  Number of livestock or size of broiler shed  + 
Non-farm  income  Yes if there is any non-farm income, 
otherwise zero 
+ 
Labor availabe with the 
household 
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